Mandatory Attorney-Client Arbitration: Enforceability of arbitration clauses in agreements for legal services

Should courts enforce arbitration clauses included in contracts for legal services? If so as a general proposition, under what circumstances should former clients be able to avoid an arbitration clause contained in retainer agreement, letter agreement, or other type of contract for legal services? In a case decided today, a panel of the First Court of Appeals in Houston rejected public policy and unconscionability arguments and granted mandamus relief to enforce arbitration against a client whom the defendant attorney had represented in a personal injury case. One justice on the three-member panel, however, dissented and wrote separately to express concern about the propriety of forcing clients to arbitrate malpractice claims against their former counsel when they were not aware of the consequences and appraised of the implications due to the attorney's failure to expressly disclose and explain the arbitration requirement. DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE CHARLES SEYMORE In consideration of the unique relationship between attorney and client, I write this dissenting opinion to express my concern about mandatory arbitration provisions in attorney-client agreements. I have no disagreement with the majority’s analysis and disposition of all issues with the exception of Shelly Letney’s claim that the method or means of inducing her signature on the agreement renders enforcement procedurally unconscionable. I adopt former Fourth Court of Appeals Chief Justice Phil Hardberger’s concern that special public-policy considerations are implicated when an attorney imposes an arbitration provision on his or her client. See Henry v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 684, 692 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d) (Hardberger, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s decision to “decline to impose a requirement that attorneys must, in all cases, fully inform prospective clients regarding implications of an arbitration clause in an attorney-client contract.” Whatever public policy may be served by enforcing arbitration agreements is more than offset by the public policy of insuring that consumers of legal services have protection from attorneys who might take advantage of their clients. Shelly Letney, a personal-injury claimant, is representative of the average consumer of legal services. She should be afforded the expectation that an attorney is obligated to fully reveal and explain potential conflicts of interests at the inception of the relationship. Moreover, the attorney should offer the prospective client an opportunity to seek advice from another source before signing an attorney-client agreement that contains language potentially detrimental to the client’s interests if the client later finds it appropriate or necessary to pursue the attorney for malpractice or other misconduct. Under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, “A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.03(b), reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, §9). The Supreme Court of Texas Professional Ethics Committee agrees that lawyers should be allowed to insert arbitration clauses in their client contracts as long as “(1) the client is aware of the significant advantages and disadvantages of arbitration and has sufficient information to permit the client to make an informed decision about whether to agree to the arbitration provision, and (2) the arbitration provision does not limit the lawyer’s liability for malpractice.” See Tex. Comm. On Prof’l Ethics, Op. 586 (2008). Notwithstanding the application of settled contract law and public policy favoring alternate dispute resolution, many respected jurists and lawyers oppose arbitration because it is not cost effective, disgorges unwary consumers of the right to a jury trial, and eliminates appellate review for errors of law. I remain a proponent of arbitration. However, when the legislature and rule-making authority in the legal profession fail to protect consumers of legal services, I believe the courts have an obligation to act because public perception of the legal profession’s ability to self-police is not favorable. Based on Shelly Letney’s averment that she was unaware of the arbitration agreement and her sworn statement that petitioner did not fully explain the terms, I would hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. LINK TO MAJORITY OPINION: Pham v. Letney (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] March 4, 2010)(Hedges) (arbitration agreement in legal services contract between lawyer and client enforced by mandamus, interlocutory appeal of order denying motion to compel arbitration dismissed, FAA applied, TAA would be preempted) INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL DISMISSED: Opinion by Chief Justice Hedges Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Seymore and Justice Sullivan 14-08-01153-CV Steven Tuan Pham v. Shelly Letney Appeal from 215th District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Levi James Benton DISSENTING OPINION by Justice Seymore in Pham v. Letney (In consideration of the unique relationship between attorney and client, Justice Seymore dissents and writes separately to express his concern about mandatory arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements / contracts for legal services) THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS WAS DOCKETED SEPARATELY [links to pdf version of opinions] In re Tuam Pham (pdf) (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] March 4, 2010)(Hedges) MOTION OR WRIT GRANTED: Opinion by Chief Justice Adele Hedges Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Seymore and Sullivan 14-09-00387-CV In Re Steven Tuam Pham Appeal from 215th District Court of Harris County Dissenting Opinion by Justice Seymore In re Tuam Pham (pdf) RELATED HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS CASE: Labidi v. Sydow, 287 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding). Labidi, MD v. Sydow (pdf) (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 25, 2009)(Guzman) (consolidation of an interlocutory appeal and a petition for writ of mandamus, challenge to district court's order compelling arbitration and staying proceedings in the trial court fails)(unconscionabiltiy argument rejected re arbitration of attorney-client disputes)(public policy arguments overruled) DISMISSED: Opinion by Justice Eva Guzman Panel members: Justices Guzman, Mirabal and Boyce 14-08-00527-CV Abdel Hakim Labidi, M.D. Ph.D. v. Michael D. Sydow, Et Al Appeal from 61st District Court of Harris County RELATED TERMS: attorney-client relationship, fiduciary duty, confidentiality, arbitration of attorney-client disputes, legal services contract with arbitration clause provision, professional legal malpractice

Lindley v. FIA Card Services NA [BofA] - Confirmation of Arb Award Set Aside on Appeal

Cardholder "wins" risky appeal from trial court's default judgment confirming arbitration award entered on FIA Card Services NA [Bank of America] credit card debt in an amount substantially lower than the amount awarded by the arbitrator. Houston Court of Appeals reverses and remands based on the discrepancy, which was not supported by any evidence in the record. Consumer will now face prospect of judgment for the entire amount, unless consumer can demonstrate that there are other reasons why the trial court should not confirm it -- a tall order. Lindley v. FIA Card Services, N.A. f/k/a MBNA America Bank, N.A. (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 18, 2010) (restricted appeal, amount of judgment confirming arbitration award varied from arbitration award, no evidence supporting modification of amount) MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUSTICE LAURA CARTER HIGLEY This is a restricted appeal in a suit to confirm an arbitration award. Appellant, John R. Lindley, appeals from a default judgment granted in favor of appellee, FIA Card Services N.A., f/k/a MBNA Bank America, N.A. (“FIA”) on a credit card debt. In three issues, Lindley contends that (1) FIA’s suit was improperly reinstated; (2) FIA failed to serve him with notice of trial settings; and (3) the default judgment is “defective.” Lindley requests a new trial, and FIA “agrees to a new trial.” We reverse and remand. Background On January 23, 2007, after arbitration proceedings on a credit-card debt, creditor FIA was awarded $16,010.84 against debtor Lindley. On April 19, 2007, FIA sued in the trial court to confirm the award. To its petition, FIA appended a copy of the arbitrator’s findings, conclusions, and award to FIA of $16,010.84. Lindley does not dispute that notice was properly served and that he did not answer the suit to confirm the award. In August 2007, FIA sought a default judgment, which the trial court denied. Trial was set for March 4, 2008. On the eve of trial, March 3, 2008, FIA moved to non-suit its claim without prejudice, which the trial court granted. A month later, on April 3, 2008, FIA filed a verified motion to reinstate its suit, which the trial court granted. On September 22, 2008, FIA again moved for a default judgment, asserting that it had filed its petition on April 19, 2007, that it had served Lindley with citation on June 22, 2007, and that Lindley had failed to answer. On October 17, 2008, the trial court granted the default judgment. The court ordered that FIA recover $7,279.17 from Lindley, as the balance due on the account. On April 14, 2009, Lindley filed a notice of restricted appeal. Restricted Appeal A party can prevail in a restricted appeal only if (1) it filed notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) it was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Ins. Co. of State of Penn. v. Lejeune, 297 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. 2009); see Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30. Here, it is undisputed that Lindley filed notice of his restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed, that he was a party to the underlying lawsuit, that he did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the default judgment, which is the judgment complained of, and that he did not timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue remaining is whether error appears on the face of the record. The face of the record consists of all the papers on file in the appeal. See Norman Comm. v. Tex. Eastman Kodak, 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997) (stating that review by restricted appeal affords appellant same scope of review as ordinary appeal, which is review of entire case). “It necessarily follows that review of the entire case includes review of legal and factual insufficiency claims.” Id. (remanding for review of appellant’s legal sufficiency point); see Herbert v. Greater Gulf Coast Enter., 915 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). A. Motion to Reinstate In his first issue, Lindley contends that the trial court erred by reinstating FIA’s suit because FIA failed to comply with Rule of Civil Procedure 165a. Rule 165a governs reinstatement after dismissal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(3). The record before us, however, does not reflect that FIA’s suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. The record reflects that FIA took a non-suit, which is not governed by Rule 165a. Lindley’s issue cannot be sustained on the grounds he advances. Accordingly, we overrule Lindley’s first issue. B. Default Judgment In his third issue, Lindley contends that error is apparent on the face of the record because FIA failed to present any evidence to support the trial court’s modification of the arbitration award. Specifically, Lindley contends that the record shows that FIA sought to confirm the arbitration award it attached to the petition, which states that FIA was awarded $16,010.04. In its judgment, however, the trial court awarded $7,279.17 to FIA. Lindley contends that there is no record of any hearing on unliquidated damages and that “there is no evidence” in the record supporting the trial court’s award. Lindley contends that “[t]he default judgment in this matter should be reversed” and that he should be “provided his day in Court.” Lindley may challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s judgment in a restricted appeal. See Norman Comm., 955 S.W.2d at 270. Lindley does not challenge the entry of a default Footnote ; rather, he solely challenges the amount of the trial court’s award. FIA states in its response that it “agrees to a new trial on this issue.” We sustain a legal sufficiency point (1) when there is a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) when rules of law or evidence preclude according weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) when the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005); El-Khoury v. Kheir, 241 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. The face of the record in a restricted appeal consists of the documents and evidence before the trial court when it rendered its judgment. See Norman Comm., 955 S.W.2d at 270. Here, the arbitration award states that the matter in this case involves interstate commerce and is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The FAA requires a trial court to confirm an arbitration award unless grounds are offered to vacate, modify, or correct the award. 9 U.S.C §§ 10,11; see Ancor Holdings, L.L.C. v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818, 826–27 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S.Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008) (holding that statutory grounds for modifying or correcting arbitration award are exclusive grounds for modification of award pursuant to FAA)); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 171.091 (Vernon 2005). Here, the record shows that the arbitrator awarded to FIA $16,010.04. The trial court issued a judgment awarding $7,279.17 to FIA. There is no testimony or evidence in the record before us regarding the trial court’s modification. We hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s modification of the arbitration award. Accordingly, we sustain Lindley’s third issue. Conclusion We conclude that Lindley has met the requirements for review by restricted appeal of the trial court’s judgment awarding $7,279.17 to FIA. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. Footnote All pending motions relating to this appeal are denied as moot. [footnotes omitted] REVERSE TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Higley Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Alcala and Higley 01-09-00323-CV John R. Lindley v. FIA Card Service, N. A. fka MBNA America Bank, N. A. [FIA is the credit card arm of Bank of America, BoA, BofA] Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 3 of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Hon. Linda Storey TAGS: Credit card debt arbitration, debt collection, suit / motion to confirm arbitration award, judicial confirmation and modification of award by arbitrator, MBNA Bank of America d/b/a FIA Card Services NA arbitration, debt collection lawsuits

EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: Hatton v. D.R. Horton, Inc. Sequel: Appeal After Arbitration Based on EAF Was Enforced by Mandamus Fails

APPELLATE OPINION AFTER MANDAMUS OFFERS NOTHING NEW In a short but signed opinion by its newest member - Justice Tracy Christopher - Houston's Fourteenth Court of Appeals declines to revisit - in an appeal from final take-nothing judgment - questions of enforceability of an arbitration requirement imposed by an employer that were previously the subject of a mandamus proceeding favorably decided for the employer. (A prior mandamus does not preclude a subsequent appeal). Hatton v. D.R. Horton, Inc. (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11, 2010) (arbitration agreement held enforceable in appeal from final judgment, with reference to prior grant of mandamus relief on same facts and legal arguments) (arbitration in the employment context, consent to arbitration by signing of AEF - employee acknowledgment form) MEMORANDUM OPINION The enforceability of the arbitration clause contained in D.R. Horton, Inc.’s employee handbook acknowledgment form is again before this Court. As we have already twice determined that the arbitration clause at issue here is valid and enforceable,[1] we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm the trial court’s judgment. Appellant Brenda Hatton began working for D.R. Horton in June of 1997 and signed its “Employee Acknowledgment Form” (“EAF”) in 2001. The EAF contained, among other matters, the arbitration clause at issue here. Hatton sued D.R. Horton in 2005 for discrimination and breach of contract. D.R. Horton filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, and the trial court denied the motion. In November 2006, a panel of this court conditionally granted D.R. Horton’s petition for writ of mandamus in this lawsuit.[2] The trial court subsequently vacated its order denying D.R. Horton’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. D.R. Horton and Hatton submitted to court-ordered binding arbitration. Following arbitration, the trial court entered a final take-nothing judgment in favor of D.R. Horton on December 11, 2008. Hatton timely filed this appeal from the trial court’s final judgment. As she did in her response to D.R. Horton’s petition for writ of mandamus, Hatton argues the arbitration provision contained in the EAF is unenforceable because it is (a) illusory, (b) indefinite, and (c) unconscionable. These are the same legal arguments made and addressed in both our prior opinion in this case and in a similar case, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Brooks.[3] In these opinions, we determined the arbitration clause at issue is valid and enforceable. Because the legal arguments in this case are the same as those addressed in our prior opinions, these opinions are controlling and we cite the parties to them. We therefore overrule Hatton’s three issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Tracy Christopher, Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Christopher. [1] D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Brooks, 207 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Hatton, Nos. 14-06-00262-CV, 14-06-00284-CV, 2006 WL 3193722, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 7, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). [2] Hatton, 2006 WL 3193722, at *1. [3] 207 S.W.3d at 867–870. The arbitration clause and other provisions contained in the EAF at issue here are set forth in Brooks; except for minor grammatical differences, the EAF signed by Hatton is the same as that set forth in that opinion. TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Christopher Panel members: Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Anderson and Christopher. 14-09-00054-CV Brenda Hatton v. D.R. Horton, Inc. [link to pdf version] Appeal from 152nd District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Kenneth Price Wise ORIGINAL MANDAMUS OPINION BY JUSTICE EVA GUZMAN

The enforceability of the arbitration clause contained in D.R. Horton, Inc.'s employee handbook acknowledgment form is again before this Court. In Cause No. 14-06-00262-CV, an interlocutory appeal, and Cause No. 14-06-00284-CV,[1] a petition for writ of mandamus, D.R. Horton seeks relief from the trial court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause.

Brenda Hatton, the appellee and real party in interest in the subject cases, began working for D.R. Horton in June of 1997 and signed its “Employee Acknowledgment Form" (“EAF") in 2001, which contained, among other matters, the arbitration clause at issue here. In 2005, Hatton filed suit against D.R. Horton, asserting a discrimination claim under the Texas Labor Code and a breach of contract claim. D.R. Horton filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the trial court denied the motion.

In the subject cases, D.R. Horton argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying arbitration because the arbitration clause is valid and covers the parties' dispute. Hatton argues the arbitration provision contained in the EAF is unenforceable because it is illusory, unconscionable, and its terms are too indefinite to form a binding contract. These are the same arguments made and addressed in our opinion issued on November 2, 2006, in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Brooks, Cause No. 14-06-00099-CV, and In re D.R. Horton, Inc., Cause No. 14-06-00152-CV.[2] In that opinion, we determined the arbitration clause was valid.

We conditionally granted D.R. Horton's petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissed its interlocutory appeal as moot. Because the facts and legal arguments in the subject consolidated cases are the same as those addressed in our November 2, 2006 opinion, that opinion is controlling and we cite the parties to it.

For the reasons stated in our November 2, 2006 opinion, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order Hatton to arbitrate her claims against D.R. Horton pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the parties. Accordingly, we conditionally grant D.R. Horton's petition for writ of mandamus in Cause No. 14-06-00284-CV and direct the trial court to vacate the order denying D.R. Horton's motion to compel and to enter an order compelling the parties to arbitration. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply with this opinion. Having granted full relief under our mandamus jurisdiction, we dismiss as moot D.R. Horton's interlocutory appeal, Cause No. 14-06-00262-CV. See In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 780 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).

/s/ Eva M. Guzman, Justice

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Memorandum Opinion filed November 7, 2006.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges, and Justices Yates and Guzman.

NOTE: Justice Eva Guzman is now a member of the Texas Supreme Court

Mediation Ordered on Appeal -- But not quite consummated

Houston appellate panel disses appeal for failure to comply with mediation order. Jones v. Union Pacific RR Co. (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11, 2010)(per curiam dismissal) (appeal dismissed for noncompliance with terms of mediation order) MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from a judgment signed March 27, 2009. On July 9, 2009, this court ordered the parties to mediation. The order states, in pertinent part, “If mediation fully resolves the issues in the case, the court ORDERS the parties to file a joint dispositive motion within 10 days of the conclusion of the mediation. If the parties need more time to effectuate the terms of the settlement agreement, they shall, within 10 days of the conclusion of the mediation, file a joint or agreed motion for an extension of time to file their dispositive motion.” On September 29, 2009, the court was advised the parties did not settle at mediation, but that a tentative agreement was reached and the parties hoped to complete the settlement within thirty days. More than thirty days passed, and no notice that the settlement had been completed was filed. On December 3, 2009, the court ordered the parties to file a response within fifteen days informing the court of the status of the settlement of this case. No response was filed. On January 6, 2010, notification was transmitted to all parties of the court’s intention to dismiss the appeal for failing to comply with this court’s December 3, 2009, order, unless a response was filed within fifteen days demonstrating good cause to continue the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c). No response was filed. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed. PER CURIAM DISMISSED: Per Curiam Panel members: Chief Justice Hedges, Justice Anderson and Justice Christopher 14-09-00541-CV Donald R. Jones, Sr. v. Union Pacific Railroad Company [pdf version] Appeal from 164th District Court of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Alexandra Smoots-Hogan

No Meeting of the Minds on Terms of Mediation - No Actionable Breach of Agreement to Mediate

MEDIATOR'S LAWSUIT SEEKING TO COLLECT MEDIATION CANCELLATION FEE ON BREACH-OF-CONTRACT THEORY FAILS - ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED In this appeal from a rather unusual case on the ADR litigation front, Houston's 14th Court of Appeals last week affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against a mediator who had sued an attorney for damages following a mediation that did not take place as scheduled. Both the trial court and reviewing court found that there was no agreement on specific terms, such as the rather hefty cancellation fee, and in-person attendance by the client. A mere letter stating the terms to govern the mediation followed by silence on the part of the attorney (against whom the claim of breach of mediation-agreement was brought) did not suffice the establish meeting of the minds element under contract formation principles. Moreover, the client who could not attend in person was willing to be available by telephone. The Levin Law Group, PC v. Sigmon (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 21, 2010)(Sullivan) (no breach of agreement to mediate on specific terms that were not agreed to, silence not assent, no meeting of the minds on cancellation fee, unforceable contract / agreement to mediate under specific terms not formed) EXCERPT FROM THE APPELLATE OPINION BY JUSTICE KENT SULLIVAN:

Background

On January 25, 2008, Allan G. Levine, an attorney for one of the plaintiffs in the underlying civil lawsuit, contacted LLG to obtain potential dates for scheduling mediation of the dispute with Alan F. Levin, the principal shareholder of LLG. After obtaining several available dates, Levine contacted Sigmon, the defendant’s attorney, and Don Fogel, the other plaintiff’s attorney in the underlying case. After checking their respective calendars, the attorneys “settled on February 8, 2008” to mediate the underlying dispute.

Levine notified Levin’s office and confirmed the date. LLG faxed a letter containing information regarding the mediation to all three attorneys on January 29, 2008. This letter provided: “In the absence of [two weeks’] advance written notice the attorneys are responsible to see that the mediator is promptly paid fifty percent (50%) of the total mediation fee as an agreed cancellation/rescheduling fee.” LLG also faxed to the attorneys an “Attorney Confidential Information Sheet and Request for Mediation” form (the “mediation request form”) and a “Rules for Mediation” form (the “mediation rules form”).

Sigmon neither completed nor signed the mediation request form. The mediation rules form contained the following paragraph:

CANCELLATION/RESCHEDULING FEE AGREEMENT. ONCE A CASE HAS BEEN SET FOR MEDIATION, THE ATTORNEYS AND THE PARTIES RECOGNIZE THAT THE MEDIATOR’S CALENDAR HAS BEEN RESERVED, AND THEY MUST THEREFORE PROVIDE THE MEDIATOR AT LEAST TWO (2) WEEKS ADVANCE WRITTEN NOTICE OF CANCELLATION/RESCHEDULING. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH ADVANCE WRITTEN NOTICE, THE ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES AGREE TO AND SHALL PAY THE MEDIATOR FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF THE TOTAL MEDIATION FEE FOR THE DAY(S) AS AN AGREED CANCELLATION/RESCHEDULING FEE. THIS RULE ALSO APPLIES TO MEDIATIONS SCHEDULED LESS THAN TWO (2) WEEKS IN ADVANCE OF THE MEDIATION DATE.

Sigmon’s client in the underlying suit was unable to attend the mediation in person, but was willing to be available by telephone; Sigmon was available and prepared to attend the mediation on his client’s behalf. Fogel objected to the lack of personal attendance by Sigmon’s client, and the mediation was cancelled.

In April 2008, LLG filed suit against Sigmon, alleging breach of contract because Sigmon refused to pay the cancellation fee listed in the mediation request form. After generally denying the allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses, Sigmon filed a traditional motion for summary judgment.

In the summary-judgment motion, Sigmon asserted (1) there was no agreement to mediate, either written or oral, (2) he did not agree to be personally obligated for any cancellation or rescheduling fees caused by his client or anyone else, and (3) his client’s intended appearance at the mediation via telephone was not a breach of any such agreement. In an affidavit attached to the motion, Sigmon stated, among other things:

· He made no agreement with respect to mediating the underlying suit;

· He made no agreement regarding the amount of or obligation for any cancellation or rescheduling fees;

· He did not reschedule or cancel the mediation;

· Fogel declined to go forward with the mediation when Sigmon’s client was unable to physically attend the mediation;

· Neither Sigmon nor his client “accepted, acquiesced, or otherwise agreed to the matters contained in (i) The Levin Law Group, P.C.’s letter of January 29, 2008, (ii) an unsigned pre-printed one page document entitled ‘Rules for Mediation,’ or (iii) a pre-printed uncompleted document entitled ‘Attorney’s Confidential Information Sheet and Request for Mediation.’”

LLG filed a response to Sigmon’s summary-judgment motion, in which it stated:

Sigmon consented to the scheduling of the mediation for February 8, 2008; he received the correspondence of January 29, 2008 with the Rules of Mediation and the Attorney’s Confidential Information Sheet and Request for Mediation; he did not object to the terms contained within those documents. Further, he received the January 30, 2008 letter reemphasizing the terms and made no objection.

LLG also attached affidavits from Levin and Levine. In his affidavit, Levin stated that because last-minute cancellations are a “huge problem” for mediators, he had implemented a cancellation policy. He stated that, in his experience, generally “all the attorneys are well familiar with the cancellation policy of this mediator as well as other quality mediators” but he “specifically call[s] the policy to the attorney’s attention every single time.”

In the affidavit, Levin also indicated that, in this specific situation, his staff forwarded a letter by facsimile to all three attorneys in the underlying case. In the first paragraph of the letter, he stated “I specifically alert you to Rule 19 dealing with cancellation/rescheduling fees.” Levin also specified the total mediation fee in this case was $6,375.00; thus the cancellation/rescheduling fee would be $3,187.50.

LLG also attached an affidavit from Levine, indicating that he contacted Levin’s assistant to obtain potential dates for mediation. Levine stated that after “dialoging” with Sigmon and Fogel, they settled on February 8, 2008, and Levine notified Levin’s office and confirmed the date. Levine averred that it was his belief the other attorneys understood personal attendance at the mediation was essential. He further stated that he recognized he and his clients were bound by the Rules of Mediation provided by Levin, including “the cancellation fee and the fact that the attorney and/or party who causes the cancellation is responsible to pay fifty percent (50%) of Mr. Levin’s total fee.” Levine explained he had never been asked by a mediator to sign any type of “formal agreement”, and he and all other “practicing, experienced attorneys who engage in mediation in Harris County, Texas, deem [themselves] and [their] clients bound to the Rules of Mediation once Mr. Levin and the date for mediation have been selected.”[1]

Sigmon replied to LLG’s response, objecting to much of the affidavit evidence. The trial court did not rule on these objections, but granted Sigmon’s summary-judgment motion on August 1, 2008. The judgment became final on September 17, 2008, and, after a motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law, this appeal timely ensued.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review [omitted]

II. Existence of a Contract

The parties agree there is no written contract in this case. LLG asserts, however, that “there is a fact issue concerning whether [Sigmon] accepted the terms of mediation by scheduling the date and failing to object to any of the terms contained in the mediation agreement,” thus precluding summary judgment.

The elements of written and oral contracts are the same and must be present for a contract to be binding. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 555 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A binding contract must have an offer and an acceptance; the acceptance must be in strict compliance with the terms of the offer. Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse, 165 S.W.3d 21, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Generally, acceptance of an offer must be communicated to the offeror for a contract to be binding. Id. at 26. Thus, silence does not ordinarily indicate acceptance of an offer. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1) cmt. a (1981)); see also Tex. Ass’n of Counties County Gov’t Risk Mgmt. Pool v. Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Tex. 2000) (noting that “as a general rule, ‘silence and inaction will not be construed as an assent to an offer’” (quoting 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:49 (4th ed. 1991))).

In this case, Levine was the only attorney who spoke with LLG and Sigmon about scheduling the mediation. In his affidavit, Levine does not indicate that, before Sigmon agreed to mediate the underlying dispute, Levine communicated either Levin’s mediation fee or cancellation/rescheduling charges. The parties agree that these terms were communicated to Sigmon after the mediation was scheduled. Thus, the fact that Sigmon agreed to mediate the dispute does not support an inference that Sigmon agreed to the mediation rules or cancellation fees. See Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 25 (acceptance must be in strict compliance with terms of offer).

In fact, Sigmon presented uncontroverted affidavit evidence that he never entered into an agreement to mediate the underlying suit under the terms and conditions specified by the letters from LLG, the mediation request form, or the mediation rules form. The only evidence LLG specifies to support its claim of an oral agreement to mediate under the written terms it provided is Sigmon’s “lack of objection” to these terms, i.e., Sigmon’s silence, after LLG faxed the written terms to him. But silence rarely indicates acceptance of an offer. See id. at 26; see also Tex. Ass’n of Counties County Gov’t Risk Mgmt. Pool, 52 S.W.3d at 132; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 69(1) (noting that assent may be inferred “[w]here an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them”).

Here, Sigmon did not take the benefit of the offered services with a “reasonable opportunity” to reject them. Ultimately, he did not take the benefit of the offered services at all. Further, the confirmation letter, mediation rules form, and mediation agreement form were faxed to Sigmon on January 29, 2008. Six days later, on Monday, February 4, 2008, Sigmon notified LLG that his client would be unable to physically attend the mediation. Thus, Sigmon’s purported lack of objection to the terms of the mediation does not indicate acceptance of LLG’s mediation rules. See Tex. Ass’n of Counties County Gov’t Risk Mgmt. Pool, 52 S.W.3d at 132; Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 26.

Additionally, it is uncontroverted that Sigmon was willing to attend the mediation on behalf of his client, and his client agreed to be available throughout the mediation by telephone. Levin and Levine both stated in their affidavits that they were willing to conduct the mediation under these conditions. The parties agree that Fogel objected to this format, and the mediation was cancelled as a result of Fogel’s objection.

Thus, if the rules for mediation require “personal attendance” as Levin states in his affidavit, Sigmon objected to the offered mediation terms by notifying LLG that his client would not be able to personally attend the mediation. If anything, this objection to LLG’s mediation terms could be deemed a counter-offer by Sigmon, which Levin and Levine accepted, but Fogel rejected. See, e.g., Lewis v. Adams, 979 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (“It is elementary that an acceptance must not change or qualify the terms of an offer; if it does, there is no meeting of the minds between the parties because the modification then becomes a counteroffer.”). At any rate, the “communications between the parties and the acts and circumstances surrounding those communications” in this case indicate that there was no meeting of the minds, and thus no offer and acceptance, regarding the essential terms of the mediation. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 S.W.3d at 556.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Sigmon conclusively established that he did not accept the terms of the mediation specified in the letters faxed by LLG, the mediation rules form, or the mediation agreement form—an essential element of LLG’s breach of contract claim. Cf. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of Desoto, Tex., Inc., 143 S.W.3d at 798; see Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc., 165 S.W.3d at 25–26. Because LLG presented no evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding this issue, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Sigmon. We accordingly overrule LLG’s issue.

AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Kent Sullivan 14-08-01165-CV The Levin Law Group, P.C. v. Ernesto De Andre Sigmon Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 4 of Harris County Trial Court Judge: Roberta Anne Lloyd TAGS: formation of contract, agreement to mediate / arbitrate, ADR - mediation costs, cancellation fee charges, meeting of the minds element in contract formation See related blog post by Victoria VanBuren on Karl Bayer's Disputing Blog: Texas Appeals Court Finds No ‘Meeting of the Minds’ in Dispute Over Mediation Cancellation Fee