Friday, March 15, 2013

When should a motion to compel arbitration be granted, when not?

General principles of determining arbitrability as articulated by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in a recent appellate opinion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

"We review a trial court's denial on a motion to compel arbitration for an abuse of discretion." Nazareth Hall Nursing Ctr. v. Melendez, 372 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.) (citing Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP v. J.A. Green Dev. Corp., 327 S.W.3d 859, 862-63 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.)). Under that standard, "we defer to the trial court's factual determinations if they are supported by evidence, but we review the trial court's legal determinations de novo." In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009); see Melendez, 372 S.W.3d at 305.

"Whether an arbitration clause imposes a duty to arbitrate is a matter of contract interpretation and a question of law for the Court to review de novo." Ascendant Anesthesia PLLC v. Abazi, 348 S.W3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). "In a de novo review, the trial court's decision is given absolutely no deference." Id.

Although Villareal opposes arbitration, he does not contest that the FAA applies to the Account Agreement with Edward Jones.

"A party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish that (1) there is a valid arbitration clause, and (2) the claims in dispute fall within that agreement's scope." In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); see In re East Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp., No. 13-12-538-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 9098, at *10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 29, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). "When deciding whether claims fall within an arbitration agreement, courts employ a strong presumption in favor of arbitration." In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 225.

"Nonetheless, the strong policy in favor of arbitration cannot serve to stretch a contractual clause beyond the scope intended by the parties or to allow modification of the unambiguous meaning of the arbitration clause." Osornia v. AmeriMex Motor & Controls, Inc., 367 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

"To determine whether a claim falls within the scope of the agreement, courts must `focus on the factual allegations of the complaint, rather than the legal causes of action asserted.'" In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 225 (quoting Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. 1995)); In re Stanford Group, 273 S.W.3d 807, 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) ("We look at the facts alleged, rather than the legal causes of actions presented, and consider whether the facts touch matters covered by the underlying arbitration agreement.") Generally, under the FAA, state law governs whether the contracting parties agreed to arbitrate and federal law determines the scope of the arbitration clause. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); see In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 224 ("Under the FAA, ordinary principles of state contract law determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.").

Arbitration agreements containing phrases such as "relating to" are interpreted broadly. In re Guggenheim Corporate Funding, LLC, 380 S.W.3d 879, 887-88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Bank One, N.A., 216 S.W.3d 825. 826-27 (Tex. 2007) (resolving doubt as to scope of arbitration agreement covering disputes "arising from or relating in any way to this Agreement" in favor of coverage); 950 Corbindale, L.P. v. Kotts Capital Holdings Ltd. P'ship, 316 S.W.3d 191, 196-97 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (holding that broad arbitration provision defining "disputes" as "any dispute under or related to the partnership agreement or any document executed pursuant to the partnership agreement or any of the transactions contemplated by the partnership agreement shall be subject to arbitration" applied to all claims); TMI Inc. v. Brooks, 225 S.W.3d 783, 791 n.7 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding) (holding that phrase "arising out of and/or related to" in arbitration agreement is "broad form in nature, evidencing the parties' intent to be inclusive rather than exclusive")). "

However, if the facts alleged in support of the claim stand alone, are completely independent of the contract, and the claim could be maintained without reference to the contract, the claim is not subject to arbitration." Serv. Corp. Int'l v. Lopez, 162 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); see Osornia, 367 S.W.3d at 714 n.4.; AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding); see also In re Estate of Rowan, No. 05-06-681-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 4466, at *8-9 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 7, 2007, no pet.) (mem. In construing the arbitration provision, we first determine whether it is possible to enforce the contract as written, without resort to parol evidence. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003).

In construing a written contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. In re Guggenheim Corporate Funding LLC, 380 S.W.3d at 887 (citing J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 229). In the arbitration context, we must give effect to the parties' intent, whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause. Id. Following arbitration jurisprudence, we apply a common-sense examination of the underlying claim and the forum-selection clause to determine if the claim comes within the scope of the clause. Id. (citing In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). "A contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning." J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 229. "On the other hand, if the contract is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations after applying the pertinent rules of construction, the contract is ambiguous, creating a fact issue on the parties' intent." Id. A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on its meaning. Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006). The issue of contractual ambiguity may be considered sua sponte by a reviewing court. See Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 284 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. 2009). op.).

SOURCE:   CORPUS CHRIST-EDINBURG COURT OF APPEALS - 13-12-00166-CV – 2/21/2013

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