"Gross mistake" challenge to arbitration award under TAA rejected in appeal from confirmation order

A few years ago the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statutory grounds provided in sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) for vacating, modifying, or correcting an arbitration award are the exclusive grounds for vacature of an arbitration award. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008). The Texas Supreme Court, by contrast, has yet to decide whether common law grounds for attacking an arbitration award under the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) are viable. See E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 270 n.7 (Tex. 2010) ("We express no opinion on this issue [of whether an arbitration under the TAA can be set aside on common law grounds.]." In a case decided last week, the First Court of Appeals in Houston entertained a challenge on the basis of “gross mistake”, and rejected it on the merits. The appellate panel, which upon rehearing had shrunk from three to two, also rejected other common-law grounds for vacature in an opinion written by Chief Justice Radack. Justice Elsa Alcala, a member of the original panel, was no longer on the Houston Court to revisit the issues on motion for re-hearing due to her elevation to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals by gubernatorial appointment.  

Ouzenne v. Haynes,  No. 01-10-00112-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [1^st Dist] April 12, 2012)(substituted opinion following motion for rehearing, which was denied)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SHERRY RADACK, Chief Justice.

We deny appellant's motion for rehearing; however, we withdraw this Court's opinion of May 12, 2001, and issue this opinion in its stead. Our judgment of May 12, 2011 remains unchanged.

This is an appeal from an order confirming an arbitration award in favor of appellee, Carnell Haynes, on his claims against appellant, Paul Ouzenne, arising out of a construction contract. In seven issues on appeal, Ouzenne contends the trial court erred in confirming the award because the arbitrator (1) made a "gross mistake," (2) exceeded his powers, and (3) violated public policy and the law. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

According to his petition, Haynes approached Ouzenne about the possibility of Ouzenne building a four-plex apartment structure on Haynes's property. In December 2006, Haynes and Ouzenne signed a construction contract for the proposed four-plex. Unable to obtain financing for the project himself, Haynes alleged that Ouzenne told him that he would obtain the financing for Haynes. Thereafter, Haynes alleged that Ouzenne had him sign a contract of sale for the property from Haynes to Ouzenne. Haynes did so because he believed that it was necessary to obtain financing for the building project, but he did not realize that he would be transferring title to the property to Ouzenne. Thereafter, Ouzenne gave Haynes notice that he intended to evict Haynes from the property.

In response, Haynes sued Ouzenne in 2007, asserting common-law fraud, statutory fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Ouzenne filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court granted.

After an arbitration before C. Johnson at the Dispute Resolution Center of Harris County, the arbitrator issued an award in Haynes's favor for $136,410.60, plus pre and post-judgment interest. Haynes moved to enter judgment based on the arbitrator's award, and Ouzenne moved to vacate the arbitrator's award. On December 15, 2009, the trial court granted Haynes's motion, denied Ouzenne's motion, and entered a judgment confirming the arbitrator's award. After the trial court denied Ouzenne's motion for new trial, this appeal followed.

CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION

Standard of Review

Review of a trial court's decision as to vacatur or confirmation of an arbitration award is de novo and an appellate court reviews the entire record. In re Chestnut Energy Partners, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 386, 397 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied); see also Statewide Remodeling, Inc. v. Williams, 244 S.W.3d 564, 567-68 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (discussing standard of review for confirmation of award). Because Texas law favors arbitration, however, our review is "extremely narrow." See Hisaw & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cornerstone Concrete Sys., Inc., 115 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); IPCO-G. & C. Joint Venture v. A.B. Chance Co., 65 S.W.3d 252, 256 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). An arbitration award has the same effect as a judgment of a court of last resort; accordingly, all reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of the award and the award is conclusive on the parties as to all matters of fact and law. CVN Group, Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex. 2002). Review of an arbitration award is so limited that even a mistake of fact or law by the arbitrator in the application of substantive law is not a proper ground for vacating an award. Crossmark, Inc. v. Hazar, 124 S.W.3d 422, 429 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Here, the parties agree that the Texas Arbitration Act governs their case. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001-.098 (Vernon 2001).

Gross Mistake

In issues one, two, four, and seven, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to vacate the arbitration award because the arbitrator committed a "gross mistake"[1] by (1) entering an award that relied on tax appraisals for determining fair market value (issues one and two), (2) failing to consider evidence that Haynes was aware and fully intended to sell his property to Ouzenne (issue four), and (3) failing to properly apply the parol evidence rule (issue seven).

Gross mistake is a Texas state common law standard that has been used to attack arbitration awards. Callahan & Assocs. v. Orangefield Indep. Sch. Dist., 92 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. 2002). A "gross mistake" is a mistake by the arbitrator that implies bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment. Anzilotti v. Gene D. Liggin, Inc., 899 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (quoting Carpenter v. N. River Ins. Co., 436 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Ouzenne argues that relying on the tax rolls to determine value was a gross mistake because tax rolls are no evidence of actual value. In support, Ouzenne relies on Housing Auth. of Dallas v. Brown, 256 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, no writ), which held that error, if any, in refusing to admit evidence of tax value was harmless because "tax rolls do not reflect actual value," but an "approximate percentage of actual value." Id. Brown, however, does not state that the value as reflected on the tax rolls is of no probative value.

Ouzenne also relies on In re Marriage of Scott, 117, S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.), which we also find distinguishable. In Scott, the wife in a divorce case presented evidence that the marital home was valued at $35,610. Id. at 583. She reached this value by relying on the tax appraisal from Hutchison County Appraisal District. Id. at 585. The court of appeals held this evidence of value was factually insufficient because the tax appraisal was over three years old on the date of trial and two experts, including the wife's own expert, valued the property at much more. Id. Scott, however, does not stand for the proposition that tax appraisals are no evidence, i.e., legally insufficient evidence, of fair market value.[2]

Thus, we conclude that the arbitrator's reliance on tax rolls to determine value does not rise to a level that implies the bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment required to show gross mistake.

Ouzenne also argues that the arbitrator committed gross mistake by disregarding testimony indicating that Haynes knew that he was selling the property to Ouzenne. However, contentions that an arbitrator disregarded even uncontroverted testimony may show a mistake of fact or law, but do not rise to the level of gross mistake. See Graham-Rutledge & Co. v. Nadia Corp., 281 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.). Furthermore, as fact-finder, the arbitrator could judge the credibility of the witnesses and choose who to believe or disbelieve. See Xtria L.L.C. v. Intern. Ins. Alliance, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 583, 597 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. denied).

Thus, we conclude that the arbitrator's decision to believe Haynes's evidence over Ouzenne's, even if erroneous, does not rise to a level that implies the bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment required to show gross mistake.

Finally, Ouzenne contends that the arbitrator committed a "gross mistake" by failing to properly apply the parol evidence rule. The arbitrator's evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, does not rise to a level that implies the bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment required to show gross mistake. See Anzilotti., 899 S.W.2d at 266 (holding that mistake of law is insufficient to set aside arbitration award).

To the extent that points of error one, two, four, and seven claim that the arbitrator failed to give an honest consideration resulting in a gross mistake, they are overruled.

Exceeds Powers

In issue three, Ouzenne contends the arbitrator exceeded his powers, which is a statutory ground for vacating an arbitration award under section 171.088(a)(3)(A) of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088(a)(3)(A). The authority of arbitrators is derived from the arbitration agreement and is limited to a decision of the matters submitted therein either expressly or by necessary implication. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Guidry, 160 Tex. 139, 327 S.W.2d 406, 408 (1959); see also Allstyle Coil Co., L.P., v. Carreon, 295 S.W.3d 42, 44 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (stating scope of authority depends on the agreement). Arbitrators exceed their powers when they decide matters not properly before them. Ancor Holdings, LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818, 829 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.); Barsness v. Scott, 126 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied).

Ouzenne argues that the arbitrator exceeded his powers because the arbitration agreement requires that all disputes "be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association ["AAA"]," and the arbitrator was not selected in accordance with those rules. Instead, Ouzenne complains that the "parties were ordered to binding arbitration at the Harris County Dispute Resolution Center," which "unilaterally selected the Arbitrator, without providing a selection process."

However, the record shows that Ouzenne did not object to the method of appointing the arbitrator until after the arbitration was completed. In fact, Ouzenne did not complain about the method for appointing the arbitrator until he filed his motion for new trial after the trial court confirmed the award.

The AAA rules upon which Ouzenne rely provide that a party must object to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in a timely manner. See Thomas Petroleum, Inc. v. Morris, No. 01-09-01065-CV, 2011 WL 742651, at *3, (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2011, no pet.) (citing EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, Rule 6(c) (formerly known as NATIONAL RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES)). The same is true under Texas common law. Id. (citing L.H. Lacy Co. v. City of Lubbock, 559 S.W.2d 348, 352-53 (Tex. 1977) (holding that, when both parties participate in arbitration proceedings, neither unequivocally withdraws its consent to arbitrate, and arbitration proceedings result in award, award is valid and enforceable)).

Thus, Ouzenne's right to complain about the method by which the arbitrator was selected is waived. See Slaughter v. Crisman & Nesbit, 152 S.W. 205, 207-08 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1912, no writ) (holding that when party to arbitration appeared and offered testimony before and after appointment of third arbitrator, he waived any irregularity in procedure occurring before the appointment of third arbitrator as required by agreement).

Because Ouzenne participated in the arbitration without complaining about the method by which the arbitrator was selected until after the arbitration was concluded and a judgment thereon was confirmed, the trial court did not err by concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by deciding matters not properly before him.

We overrule issue three.

Violates Public Policy and the Law

In issues five and six, Ouzenne contends the trial court erred in failing to vacate the arbitration award because it "violates public policy and the law." Specifically, Ouzenne complains that (1) the arbitration award did not specify a "laundry list" DTPA violation, and (2) was not based on a good or service as defined by the DTPA.

Ouzenne's claim, however, is not that the award should be vacated because it is unlawful,[3] but that the trial court committed an error of law. And, although Ouzenne claims that the award violates public policy, he cites no way in which the award violates "carefully articulated, fundamental policy." CVN Group, 95 S.W.3d at 239.

"[A]lleged errors in the application of substantive law by the arbitrators during the proceedings in arbitration are not reviewable by the court on a motion to vacate an award." Jamison & Harris v. Nat'l Loan Investors, 939 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1997, writ denied). A mistake of fact or law is insufficient to set aside an arbitration award. Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266.

We overrule issues five and six.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.[4]

For footnotes, click below:

Abilene Housing Authority v. Gene Duke Builders, Inc. (Tex. 2007)

Abilene Housing Authority vs. Gene Duke Builders, No. 05-0631 (Tex. Jun. 1, 2007)(per curiam)(construction law, contract, arbitration, public entity, immunity claim) Abilene Housing Authority, Petitioner, v. Gene Duke Builders, Inc., Respondent ══════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District of Texas ══════════════════════════════════ PER CURIAM The Abilene Housing Authority contracted with Gene Duke Builders, Inc. for repair of housing units. After a dispute arose concerning completion and payment, Duke, pursuant to the contract, filed a claim with the “contracting officer,” the Authority’s executive director, to no avail. Duke then sought to appeal by demanding arbitration. When the Authority refused, Duke sued the Authority to compel arbitration. At first the trial court ordered arbitration, but the Authority then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the procedures for resolving claims against the State in chapter 2260 of the Texas Government Code[1] provided the exclusive forum for Duke’s claim.[2] In response, Duke argued, among other things, that the Authority was not a “unit of state government” to which chapter 2260 applied.[3] That term is defined by section 2260.001(4) to include any “entity that is in any branch of state government and that is created by the constitution or a statute,” but it expressly excludes “special purpose district[s].”[4] The trial court agreed with the Authority, vacated the order compelling arbitration, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a municipal housing authority is not a “unit of state government” to which chapter 2260 applies.[5] We agree, for essentially the reasons offered by the court of appeals. Thus, chapter 2260 does not bar Duke’s suit. The court of appeals further held that the Authority’s immunity from suit was waived by section 392.065 of the Texas Local Government Code, which lists in one sentence the “miscellaneous powers” of housing authorities and states in pertinent part: “An authority may: (1) sue and be sued . . . .” After the court issued its opinion, we decided Tooke v. City of Mexia, which holds in part that section 51.075 of the Texas Local Government Code, stating that a home-rule municipality “may plead and be impleaded in any court,” does not waive immunity from suit because neither the brief provision itself nor its broader statutory context reflect a clear and unambiguous legislative intent to waive immunity from suit.[6] The text of section 392.065 no more reflects an intent to waive immunity than the text of section 51.075, and Duke does not argue that such an intent can be gleaned from the broader statutory context in which the former appears, a subject on which we express no opinion. The court of appeals’ opinion is thus inconsistent with Tooke, and we disapprove it. But we also held in Tooke[7] that absent some other waiver of immunity, sections 271.151-.160 of the Texas Local Government Code (enacted a month before the court of appeals issued its decision in this case[8]) retroactively waive, with limitations, immunity from suit for the “adjudication”[9] of certain claims against a “local governmental entity” defined as “a political subdivision of this state, other than . . . a unit of state government, as that term is defined by Section 2260.001, Government Code, including a . . . special‑purpose district or authority . . . .”[10] Special-purpose districts, expressly excluded under chapter 2260, are expressly included under sections 271.151-.160. The parties should have the opportunity on remand to address the applicability of these provisions and any other arguments.[11] Accordingly, we grant the Authority’s petition for review, and without hearing oral argument,[12] reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Opinion delivered: June 1, 2007 [1] Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2260.001-.108. [2] Id. § 2260.005 (“Subject to Section 2260.007 [retaining the Legislature’s authority to deny or grant immunity by any means], the procedures contained in this chapter are exclusive and required prerequisites to suit in accordance with Chapter 107, Civil Practice and Remedies Code [regarding legislative permission to sue the State]. This chapter does not prevent a contractor sued by a unit of state government from asserting a counterclaim or right of offset against the unit of state government in the court in which the unit of state government files the suit.”). [3] Id. § 2260.051(a) (“A contractor may make a claim against a unit of state government for breach of a contract between the unit of state government and the contractor.”). [4] Id. § 2260.001(4) (“‘Unit of state government’ means the state or an agency, department, commission, bureau, board, office, council, court, or other entity that is in any branch of state government and that is created by the constitution or a statute of this state, including a university system or institution of higher education. The term does not include a county, municipality, court of a county or municipality, special purpose district, or other political subdivision of this state.”). [5] 168 S.W.3d 215, 218-20 (Tex. App.CEastland 2005). [6] 197 S.W.3d 325, 342 (Tex. 2006). [7] Id. at 344-45. [8] Act of May 23, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 604, §§ 1-3, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1548. [9] Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 271.151(1) (“‘Adjudication’ of a claim means the bringing of a civil suit and prosecution to final judgment in county or state court and includes the bringing of an authorized arbitration proceeding and prosecution to final resolution in accordance with any mandatory procedures established in the contract subject to this subchapter for the arbitration proceedings.”). [10] Id. § 271.151(3) (“‘Local governmental entity’ means a political subdivision of this state, other than a county or a unit of state government, as that term is defined by Section 2260.001, Government Code, including a: (A) municipality; (B) public school district and junior college district; and (C) special‑purpose district or authority, including any levee improvement district, drainage district, irrigation district, water improvement district, water control and improvement district, water control and preservation district, freshwater supply district, navigation district, conservation and reclamation district, soil conservation district, communication district, public health district, emergency service organization, and river authority.”). [11] City of Houston v. Jones, 197 S.W.3d 391, 392 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). [12] Tex. R. App. P. 59.1.

In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006)

In re D. Wilson Construction Co., No. 05-0326, Jun. 30, 2006)(Willett)(arbitration mandamus, construction contracts, interlocutory appeal, ILA) In re D. Wilson Construction Company, et al., Relators ══════════════════════ On Petition for Writ of Mandamus ══════════════════════ consolidated with American Standard and the Trane Company, et al. v. Brownsville Independent School District, No. 05-0327 (Tex. Jun. 30, 2006)(Willett) (On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas) Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice O’Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Medina, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson joined. Justice Brister filed a concurring opinion. In this consolidated proceeding, we decide whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal under the Texas Arbitration Act and whether the parties’ arbitration agreements are ambiguous. We hold that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and that the agreements are not ambiguous. I. Background In 1993, the Brownsville Independent School District contracted with two general contractors, D. Wilson Construction Company and Stotler Construction Company, to build two schools in Brownsville. Both contracts incorporate General Conditions and Supplementary Conditions. The General Conditions expressly incorporate AIA Document A201, a standard construction industry document published by the American Institute of Architects that details the parties’ respective rights, responsibilities and relationships on the project.[1] Paragraph 4.5 of A201 is titled “Arbitration,” and subparagraph 4.5.1, titled “Controversies and Claims Subject to Arbitration,” sets forth the broad, catch-all scope of the arbitration agreement: “Any controversy or Claim arising out of or related to the Contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . .” The Supplementary Conditions state that they “modify, change, delete from or add to” the General Conditions. Among other things, the Supplementary Conditions “[a]dd new Clause 4.5.1.1” to the arbitration provision: “Except as otherwise provided in this Contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract, which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by [BISD] . . . . The decision of [BISD] shall be final and conclusive unless” it is timely appealed to the Superintendent and then to the BISD Board of Trustees, “whose decision shall be final and conclusive.” This litigation began when one of the subcontractors, American Standard and the Trane Company (Trane), sought injunctive relief against BISD to preserve evidence in a personal injury action that students and teachers brought against Trane in another court. BISD counterclaimed for alleged defects in the construction of the two schools and filed third-party actions against several parties, including general contractors Wilson and Stotler, as well as subcontractors and second-tier subcontractors. Trane and the third-party defendants filed or joined motions to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, and the Texas Arbitration Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 171.001–.098.[2] After a hearing, the trial court issued a brief letter ruling denying arbitration, saying “the Court finds the contract in question ambiguous.” Trane and the third-party defendants filed both a petition for writ of mandamus under the FAA and an interlocutory appeal under the TAA, and the court of appeals consolidated the two proceedings. __ S.W.3d __, __, Nos. 13-04-184-CV, 13-04-333-CV, 2005 WL 310777, at *1 (citing In re Valero Energy Corp., 968 S.W.2d 916, 916–17 (Tex. 1998)). The court of appeals dismissed the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding the TAA inapplicable since the dispute concerned a “‘transaction involving commerce.’“ Id. at __, 2005 WL 310777, at *2 (quoting In re MONY Sec. Corp., 83 S.W.3d 279, 282–83 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, consolidated appeal and orig. proceeding). The court also denied the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that clause 4.5.1.1 in the Supplementary Conditions creates ambiguity. Id. at __, 2005 WL 310777, at *3. In this appeal, Trane and the third-party defendants complain that (1) the court of appeals erred in dismissing their interlocutory appeal under the TAA for want of jurisdiction, and (2) the trial court erred in deeming the arbitration agreements ambiguous and abused its discretion in denying their motions to compel arbitration. II. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals Trane and the third-party defendants first argue that the court of appeals erred in dismissing their TAA-based interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. We agree.[3] The contracts in question reference neither the FAA nor TAA, merely noting that “[t]he Contracts shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located.” We have interpreted identical language to invoke federal and state law. In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125, 127–28 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (consolidated appeal and orig. proceeding). Trane and the third-party defendants sought relief under both statutes in the court of appeals, bringing a petition for writ of mandamus under the FAA, see Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272–73 (Tex. 1992), and an interlocutory appeal under the TAA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.098(a)(1). While refusing jurisdiction under the TAA, the court of appeals recognized that it at least had jurisdiction under the FAA to consider the mandamus petition. __ S.W.3d at __, 2005 WL 310777, at *2. We held in Jack B. Anglin Co. that mandamus is appropriate to review a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA. 842 S.W.2d at 272–73. The court of appeals determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal under the TAA because the construction contracts involved interstate commerce, thus implicating the FAA. __ S.W.3d at __, 2005 WL 310777, at *2; see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (the FAA applies when the dispute concerns a “contract evidencing interstate commerce”); 9 U.S.C. § 1 (“‘commerce’ . . . means commerce among the several States”); In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d at 127 (noting that the FAA “extends to any contract affecting commerce, as far as the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution will reach”). The court of appeals is not alone in dismissing interlocutory appeals under the TAA when the FAA applies. See Kroupa v. Casey, Nos. 01-05-00224-CV, 01-05-00376-CV, 2005 WL 3315279, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, consolidated appeal and orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication); Am. Med. Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 149 S.W.3d 265, 269–70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, consolidated appeal and orig. proceeding); Verlander Family Ltd. P’ship v. Verlander, No. 08-02-00135-CV, 2003 WL 304098, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.); Pennzoil Co. v. Arnold Oil Co., 30 S.W.3d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, consolidated appeal and orig. proceeding). Other courts have granted mandamus relief and dismissed the consolidated interlocutory appeal as moot. See, e.g., Kirby Highland Lakes Surgery Ctr., L.L.P. v. Kirby, 183 S.W.3d 891, 895 & n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, consolidated appeal and orig. proceeding); In re MacGregor (FIN) Oy, 126 S.W.3d 176, 181, 184 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, consolidated appeal and orig. proceeding). We take this opportunity to clarify precisely when the FAA preempts the TAA. Many courts of appeals wrongly view the FAA and TAA as mutually exclusive, but the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held a different view for some time: the FAA only preempts contrary state law, not consonant state law. The United States Supreme Court has said: The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration. But even when Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in an area, state law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law—that is, to the extent that it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” The question before us, therefore, is whether application of [state law] to stay arbitration under this contract in interstate commerce . . . would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477–78 (1989) (citations omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Similarly, this Court has noted that the FAA “preempts state statutes to the extent they are inconsistent with that Act.” Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 271. Recently, in the case of In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., this Court articulated a four-factor test to determine whether the TAA would thwart the goals and policies of the FAA in a particular case. 173 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (construing 9 U.S.C. § 2). The FAA only preempts the TAA if: “(1) the agreement is in writing, (2) it involves interstate commerce, (3) it can withstand scrutiny under traditional contract defenses [under state law], and (4) state law affects the enforceability of the agreement.” Id. (emphasis added). In today’s case, the court of appeals ignored the fourth factor. The mere fact that a contract affects interstate commerce, thus triggering the FAA, does not preclude enforcement under the TAA as well. For the FAA to preempt the TAA, state law must refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that the FAA would enforce, either because (1) the TAA has expressly exempted the agreement from coverage, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.002(a) (detailing various claims the TAA “does not apply to”), or (2) the TAA has imposed an enforceability requirement not found in the FAA, see In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d at 69 (“The TAA interferes with the enforceability of the arbitration agreement by adding an additional requirement—the signature of a party’s counsel—to arbitration agreements in personal injury cases.”). The parties have asserted nothing in the TAA or other state law that would subvert enforcement of the agreements at issue. Therefore, the FAA does not preempt the TAA in this case, and the court of appeals had jurisdiction under both laws.[4] III. Ambiguity of the Arbitration Agreements Trane and the third-party defendants next argue that the trial court wrongly deemed the arbitration agreements ambiguous and abused its discretion in denying their motions to compel arbitration. We decide the merits under our mandamus jurisdiction.[5] Mandamus is proper to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal, Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding), as when a party is erroneously denied its contracted-for arbitration rights under the FAA, Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 272–73. Also, a trial court “has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. In evaluating a motion to compel arbitration, a court must determine first whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and then whether the agreement encompasses the claims raised. In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate under the FAA, courts should apply ordinary state law principles regarding the formation of contracts. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227–28 (Tex. 2003). In a letter ruling, the trial court found “the contract in question ambiguous”; however, the record does not indicate whether the trial court was uncertain as to the agreements’ existence or merely their scope. We address these two issues in turn. A. Ambiguity Concerning the Existence of Valid Agreements Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists is a legal question subject to de novo review. J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227. Whether contractual ambiguity exists is likewise a question of law. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996). Inartful drafting does not alone render a contractual provision ambiguous. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1951). A contract is ambiguous only if it is subject to “two or more reasonable interpretations after applying the pertinent rules of construction.” Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 940 S.W.2d at 589. Ambiguity does not exist merely because the parties assert forceful and diametrically opposing interpretations. Id. BISD contends that the contracts with Wilson and Stotler (1) contain no arbitration language at all, or (2) contain ambiguous language. The trial court’s three-sentence letter ruling is silent on the first point, while the court of appeals, “[a]ssuming without determining that the contracts contain arbitration language,” concluded that “the supplementary conditions create ambiguity.” __ S.W.3d at __, 2005 WL 310777, at *3. We disagree with BISD that its contracts with Wilson and Stotler contained no arbitration language. The contracts validly and expressly incorporate by reference the expansive arbitration language of subparagraph 4.5.1 of A201. Innumerable contracts are consummated every day in Texas that incorporate other documents by reference. A contractual term is not rendered invalid merely because it exists in a document incorporated by reference, Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1968), and we agree with the courts of appeals that arbitration-related language is no exception to this rule. See, e.g., Teal Constr. Co./Hillside Villas Ltd. v. Darren Casey Interests, Inc., 46 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied) (holding that an unsigned arbitration agreement contained in a document incorporated by reference into the signed contract constitutes an enforceable arbitration agreement); D. Wilson Constr. Co. v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., 848 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (rejecting the argument that an arbitration agreement incorporated by reference is invalid or unenforceable). Accordingly, we reject BISD’s argument that these provisions were not validly incorporated into the contracts with Wilson and Stotler. We likewise reject BISD’s argument, and the trial court’s holding, that the arbitration agreements are ambiguous. Subparagraph 4.5.1 of A201 states: ”Any controversy or Claim arising out of or related to the Contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . .” The Supplementary Conditions “[a]dd new Clause 4.5.1.1” to the arbitration provision: ”Except as otherwise provided in this Contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract, which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by [BISD] . . . . The decision of [BISD] shall be final and conclusive unless” it is timely appealed to the Superintendent and then to the BISD Board of Trustees, “whose decision shall be final and conclusive.” The caption of clause 4.5.1.1 in the Supplementary Conditions evinces the parties’ intent to “[a]dd new Clause 4.5.1.1 to subparagraph 4.5.1.” Clause 4.5.1.1 is added to subparagraph 4.5.1, and the clause’s numerical designation places it beneath subparagraph 4.5.1. In addition, clause 4.5.1.1 begins with the caveat, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Contract.” Subparagraph 4.5.1 does provide otherwise in certain cases. If the parties intended for clause 4.5.1.1 to supplant subparagraph 4.5.1, they could have easily drafted language to accomplish exactly that.[6] Further, clause 4.5.1.1 does not mention the additional arbitration procedures set forth in subparagraphs 4.5.2–4.5.7. If clause 4.5.1.1 negates subparagraph 4.5.1, as BISD contends, then subparagraphs 4.5.2–4.5.7 are meaningless. The placement, caption, and caveat of clause 4.5.1.1, as well as the language of subparagraphs 4.5.2–4.5.7, indicate that the clause is subordinate to subparagraph 4.5.1 if subparagraph 4.5.1 applies in a given situation. BISD argues that such a construction would render clause 4.5.1.1 meaningless. We disagree. By its terms, clause 4.5.1.1 applies to “any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract,” while subparagraph 4.5.1 applies to “[a]ny controversy or Claim arising out of or relating to the Contract, or the breach thereof . . . .” (emphasis added). While the scope of clause 4.5.1.1 is narrower than the scope of subparagraph 4.5.1, certain situations would fall solely under the factual dispute clause. For example, the construction contracts could have called for solid brass doorknobs throughout the schools. BISD could have argued that the doorknobs Wilson and Stotler used were brass-plated instead of solid brass. Whether the doorknobs are solid brass or brass-plated would be a factual dispute subject to clause 4.5.1.1. We hold that the arbitration agreements and clause 4.5.1.1 can be reconciled; the arbitration agreements are not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation and are therefore not ambiguous. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 940 S.W.2d at 589. B. Ambiguity Concerning the Scope of the Agreements We next consider whether there is ambiguity concerning the agreements’ scope. The strong presumption favoring arbitration generally requires that we resolve doubts as to the scope of the agreements in favor of coverage. In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005); In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001); Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). Once an agreement is established, “a court should not deny arbitration ‘unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue.’” Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (emphasis in original) (quoting Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990)). Here, BISD claims there are construction defects throughout the two schools. This dispute is a “controversy or Claim arising out of or related to the Contract” to build the schools and thus falls squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreements. We find no ambiguity in either the validity or the scope of these arbitration agreements. Trane and the third-party defendants have proven the existence of valid arbitration agreements that cover the present dispute. In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d at 573. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the motions to compel arbitration after finding “the contract in question ambiguous.” C. Waiver Finally, BISD argues that Trane and Stotler waived any right to arbitrate. In a personal injury suit filed by students and teachers in a separate court, Trane, Stotler, and Mac’s Insulation, Inc. filed cross-actions against BISD, seeking indemnity in that case. Trane also filed the present suit against BISD to obtain injunctive relief to preserve evidence in that personal injury case. There is a strong presumption against waiver under the FAA. In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., __ S.W.3d __, __, 2006 WL 662335, at *2 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). “Merely taking part in litigation is not enough unless a party ‘has substantially invoked the judicial process to its opponent’s detriment.’” Id. (quoting In re Serv. Corp. Int’l, 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002)). In In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., we held that the relators, who litigated in the trial court for two years, did not substantially invoke the judicial process to their opponent’s detriment because the relators engaged in minimal discovery, and the real party in interest failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice to overcome the strong presumption against waiver. Id. at __, 2006 WL 662335, at *3. Likewise, BISD has failed to demonstrate how the cross-actions for indemnity in the separate personal injury suit or Trane’s pursuit of injunctive relief related to that case have worked to BISD’s detriment. We hold that the actions of Trane, Stotler, and Mac’s Insulation, Inc. do not constitute waiver of their right to arbitrate. IV. Conclusion The trial court abused its discretion by finding the contracts ambiguous and denying the motions to compel arbitration. There is no ambiguity in either the existence or scope of these arbitration agreements. We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to (1) vacate its order denying the motions to compel arbitration, (2) grant Stotler’s motion to compel arbitration, (3) conduct further proceedings to determine whether Wilson is entitled to arbitration,[7] and (4) conduct further proceedings to determine whether the various nonsignatories are entitled to arbitration. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply. Insofar as we have granted full relief under our mandamus jurisdiction, we dismiss the related interlocutory appeal as moot. _______________________________________ Don R. Willett Justice Opinion delivered: June 30, 2006 [1] Document Synopses by Series, at http://www.aia.org/docs_series. The American Institute of Architects represents the professional interests of America’s architects. The AIA: Advocacy Community, Knowledge, at http://www.aia.org/about_default. Among other things, the AIA publishes industry standard documents for design and construction projects. About AIA Contract Documents, at http://www.aia.org/docs_about&defPr’1. Document A201 “is frequently adopted by reference into a variety of other agreements . . . to establish a common basis for the primary and secondary relationships on the typical construction project.” Instruction Sheet for AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction—1987 Edition at 1, available at http://www.engin.umich.edu/class/cee431/AIA/A201Inst.PDF. In the instant case, the General Conditions incorporate the 1987 (14th) Edition of AIA Document A201, which is approved and endorsed by the Associated General Contractors of America. AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (1987). [2] Four third-party defendants filed independent motions to compel arbitration: Wilson, Stotler, Mijares Mora Architects, Inc., and Zamora Engineering, Inc. Mac’s Insulation, Inc. joined Stotler’s motion. Trane, Victoria Air Conditioning, Ltd., and Superheat Air Balancing Co., Inc. joined the Wilson and Stotler motions. Al Cardenas Masonry Inc. joined Trane’s motion. Sechrist-Hall Co., Wrightway Construction, Inc., and Rio Mechanical, Inc. joined the Wilson and Trane motions. The independent motions of Mijares Mora Architects, Inc. and Zamora Engineering, Inc. do not invoke the FAA or TAA. Wilson’s motion is not in the record, and we are thus unable to determine whether it invokes the FAA, TAA, both, or neither. All other motions invoke the FAA or both the FAA and the TAA. The motions of all subcontractors and second-tier subcontractors also argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel allows nonsignatories to the Wilson and Stotler contracts to obtain the benefits of the arbitration agreements therein. [3] This Court undeniably has jurisdiction to review the correctness of the court of appeals’ decision that it lacked jurisdiction over the TAA-based interlocutory appeal. See McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tex. 2001) (“When a court of appeals determines that it lacks jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal, this Court has jurisdiction to review that decision.”). [4] While we continue to see no benefit in requiring parties to pursue parallel proceedings that are “unnecessarily expensive and cumbersome,” we remain mindful that “we may not enlarge appellate jurisdiction absent legislative mandate.” Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 272. We again invite the Legislature, “[i]n the interests of promoting the policy considerations of rigorous and expedited enforcement of arbitration agreements, . . . to consider amending the Texas Act to permit interlocutory appeals of orders issued pursuant to the Federal Act.” Id. [5] Our analysis today proceeds under the FAA because, as a procedural matter, Trane and the third-party defendants only assert in their “Statement of Jurisdiction” that this Court has jurisdiction under Cortez to decide whether the lower court had jurisdiction. 66 S.W.3d at 231 (“When a court of appeals determines that it lacks jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal, this Court has jurisdiction to review that decision.”). They do not assert “conflict or dissent” jurisdiction under the general interlocutory appeal statute. Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.225(c). [6] A subparagraph later in the Supplementary Conditions states that it “[d]elete[s] the first sentence [of subparagraph 5.2.1 of the General Conditions] and substitute[s] the following . . . .” Clearly, the parties thus were free able to delete and replace language in the General Conditions with language in the Supplementary Conditions, ands they had done so elsewhere. [7] Wilson’s motion to compel arbitration is not in the record.